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The Welfare Loss from Differential Taxation 





In the spirit of Harberger, we apply a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
and estimate the excess burden stemming from the tax-induced distortion in the allocation of 
capital across the corporate and the non-corporate sectors in Germany. In doing so, we 
perform a counterfactual analysis and ask how the allocation of capital across sectors would 
change compared with a sector-neutral tax system which assures an identical effective tax 
burden on both sectors. Our estimates suggest that the excess burden per period ranges from 
2.0 to 3.6 billion Euros or from about 0.1 to 0.16 per cent of GDP. In present value terms, the 
excess burden translates to about 104 billion Euros or 4.7 per cent of GDP. In order to 
identify the impact of the firm’s financial behaviour on the size of the emerging excess 
burden, we perform several sensitivity analyses with regard to debt financing, external equity 
financing and debt constraints via agency cost. 
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1. Introduction 
   In nearly all OECD countries - with the exception of only a few countries who installed a full 
imputation system - the returns of corporate investments are subject to a full or at least partial 
double taxation, while the returns of investments in unincorporated firms are taxed only once, via 
the personal income tax of the owner. Nevertheless, in OECD countries corporate firms do face 
on average a lower effective tax burden compared with non-corporate firms, since the fierce 
international tax competition has put major downward pressure on the various types of capital 
taxes. Thus, the effective tax burden on corporate firms has declined, while the effective tax 
burden on labour income and thus on unincorporated firms has stayed constant or even risen in 
some countries (DEVEREUX, et al. 2002). Consequently, the question arises whether the efficiency 
loss caused by the non-uniform tax treatment of corporate and unincorporated firms is a 
quantitatively important issue. This paper aims to answering the question by taking the German 
case as an example. 
     In the spirit of HARBERGER
1, we apply a dynamic, computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model and estimate the excess burden stemming from the tax-induced distortion in the allocation 
of capital across the corporate and non-corporate sectors in Germany. In doing so, we perform a 
counterfactual analysis and raise the question how the allocation of capital across sectors would 
change if a ‘sector neutral’ tax system is in place. Such a tax system ensures that both 
incorporated and unincorporated firms are subject to the same tax treatment. The developed CGE 
model traces the accumulation of capital within each sector from the initial to the final steady 
state, thus allowing us to compute the excess burden for each single period as well as for the 
phase of transition as such. The excess burden itself is computed as the amount of ‘misallocated’ 
capital times the difference in the marginal product of capital between the corporate and non-
corporate sector. Since a firm's financial behaviour has a major impact on its effective tax burden, 
and consequently on its investment decision, we conduct several sensitivity analyses to identify 
the effect of different financial equilibria on the size of the excess burden emerging from the 
unequal taxation of sectors in Germany. 
                                                 
1 The distortive power of corporate taxation was first analysed by HARBERGER in his seminal 1962 and 1966 papers. 
Following HARBERGER, the corporate tax drives a wedge between the marginal product of the capital of corporate 
and unincorporated firms such that too little capital is accumulated within the more heavily taxed corporate sector, 
leading to a shortfall of aggregate output. In the German case, we have to put the cart before the horse since the 
corporate sector faces a lower effective tax burden compared with non-corporate firms. Accordingly, when earnings 
are retained, too little capital is accumulated within the German non-corporate sector vis-à-vis the German corporate 
sector.   3
    Regarding the related literature, there are several studies that deal with the tax-induced change 
in the organisational form of firms.
2 The number of articles which quantify the Harberger type of 
excess burden emerging from the tax-induced distortion in the allocation of capital across sectors 
is, however, rather limited. Important contributions to the latter strand include the studies of 
GRAVELLE and KOTLIKOFF (1989 and 1993) who measure the movement of capital between 
corporate and non-corporate production with respect to the difference between corporate and 
non-corporate capital taxation. On the basis of a Mutual Production Model, where corporate and 
non-corporate production are close substitutes and all substitution elasticities equal one, the 
authors quantify a dead-weight loss amounting to 19 per cent of tax revenues.
3 Our analysis 
differs from their work in two respects: First, we assume that corporate and non-corporate 
productions are perfect substitutes, such that our estimates of the excess burden might turn out to 
be larger. Second, we also deal with the issue of different financial equilibria like debt vis-à-vis 
equity finance which are not considered in the above-mentioned studies. 
    The paper is structured as follows: The subsequent section introduces the theoretical setup of 
the CGE model and outlines the prevailing tax differential between German incorporated and 
unincorporated firms. Section three describes the empirical implementation of the CGE model. 
The conducted simulations and sensitivity analyses are presented in sections four and five while 
section six concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical setup of the CGE Model 
    The dynamic CGE model applied is a two-country model based on the neoclassical growth 
theory.
4 Saving and investment decisions are forward-looking and thus permit consideration of 
important tax capitalisation effects. The firm sector is divided into corporate (f=C) and 
unincorporated (f=NC) firms which both aim to maximise their value. The firm's optimal 
investment and financial behaviour is derived from an inter-temporal investment model with 
convex adjustment costs and convex agency costs of debt finance. The model therefore mimics 
the most important behavioural margins at the firm level that are strongly sensitive to the effects 
                                                 
2 The studies by GORDON and MACKIE-MASON (1994, 1997), GOOLSBEE (1998, 2004), or CARROLL and JOULFAIAN 
(1997), for instance, provide some evidence that US firms do indeed react to prevailing tax differentials with a shift 
in their organisational form, even though the estimated response is only small. 
3 If the within-industry substitution elasticity is increased to 10, the excess burden ranges between 39 and 58 per cent 
of tax revenues and it can even reach 102 per cent of tax revenues if an elasticity of 30 is assumed. 
4 The complete model documentation is available in RADULESCU (2007) or STIMMELMAYR (2007).   4
of capital income taxation. The household sector consists of a representative infinitively-living 
individual which maximises its lifetime utility.
5 
    The well-behaved, neoclassical production technology, Y
f=f(K
f,L
f), relies on capital, K, and 
labour, L, as input factors and the price of the output good is normalised to unity. Accounting for 
adjustment costs of size J
f(I
f,K
f), which resemble decreasing returns from capital accumulation
6, 
as well as labour costs, wL, and depreciation of capital, δK, the net of tax profits, π, of the 
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    The expression (i+m
f)B
f depicts the cost of debt finance and consists of debt interest, iB
f, as 
well as convex agency cost of the size m
fB
f.
7 Profits of each firm type are subject to a profit tax, 
τ
P,f, which either represents the corporate tax, τ
P,C, or the personal income tax of the firm-owner, 
τ
P,NC. In contrast with unincorporated firms, the distributed and retained profits of corporate firms 
are taxed twice, first on the corporate level by the corporate tax and second on the shareholder 
level by the dividend or capital gains tax, respectively.
8 The optimal investment and financial 
behaviour of each firm is briefly outlined in the following subsection. 
 
Source of Funds and Investment Behaviour 
    Firms in the corporate sector have access to three different sources of finance. They can (1) 
postpone dividend payment and thus finance their investments by retained earnings, (π
C-χ
C), (2) 
they can rely on new equity injections, VN
C, or (3) on external capital, BN
C. Depending on the 
constellation of tax rates a profit-maximising firm would always choose the least expensive 
source of finance. In order to prevent debt from being the sole source of finance employed, we 
introduce convex agency costs of debt, m=m(b




f, increases. From an economic point of view, the agency cost can be justified as 
                                                 
5 We have chosen to represent the household sector as an infinitively-living individual since we mainly focus on the 
efficiency outcomes rather than on the distributional issues of taxation. 
6 The adjustment cost function, J(I,K), is assumed to be linearly homogeneous in investments, I, and capital, K, and 
convex in investments, JI and JII>0. Moreover, the steady-state adjustment costs are assumed to be zero. 
7 The agency costs of debt are discussed below in greater detail. 
8 Even if retained earnings are subject to double taxation, they face a preferential tax treatment if capital gains are 
taxed on a realisation rather than an accrual basis. According to OECD estimates (OECD 1991), the effective tax 
burden on capital gains amounts to about 60 per cent of the statutory tax burden.   5
banks will charge heavily-indebted firms higher agency cost of debt in order to account for the 
increased risk of bankruptcy. The specification of the convex agency cost function follows 
STRULIK (2003) and is empirically confirmed for the German case. 
    Moreover, we introduce an exogenous parameter β which determines the share of external 
equity in total investment funds, VN
C=β·IN
C.
9 This parameter β is calibrated according to the 
ratio of new shares issued by German corporations listed at the German stock exchange for 
German corporate investments. In 2003 for instance, new share issues of German corporations 
amounted to 12.2 billion Euro (Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2004) and German corporate 
investments to 203.1 billion Euro (GERMAN CENTRAL BANK 2007a, b), indicating that a share of 
6.0 per cent of German corporate investments was financed by new share issues in 2003. Since 
the amount of new share issues moves procyclically, we set β equal to 7 per cent. The latter 
represents the medium run average of the fraction of new share issues used as investment funds 
over the period 1996 to 2003. 
    When β is set equal to one, all corporate investments are financed by new equity injections and 
hence the model replicates the old view of dividend taxation. If the model is, however, supposed 
to be in line with the new view of dividend taxation, β needs to be set equal to zero, implying that 
corporate investments are solely financed by retained earnings.
10 On the basis of the nucleus 
theory of the firm (SINN, 1991b) the parameter β can also be interpreted as a measure which 
balances the share of immature and mature firms in the economy as a whole.
11 Hence, the 
calibration of β=0.07 implies that Germany is modelled as a rather mature economy with only a 
small share (7 per cent) of immature firms. 
    Furthermore, we calibrate the firm’s financial behaviour in the initial steady-state according to 
the empirical data provided by the GERMAN CENTRAL BANK (2007a, b). These data suggest an 
average debt-asset ratio of 41 per cent for corporations and of 59 per cent for unincorporated 
firms. During the phase of transition, the amount of retained earnings and debt is determined 
endogenously, while the amount of new share issues is fixed via the exogenous parameter β. 
                                                 
9 A similar approach for modelling the financial behaviour of corporations is also applied by FEHR (1999). 
10 A survey on the different views on dividend taxation is provided by AUERBACH (2002), SINN (1991a), SØRENSEN 
(1995) or ZODROW (1991), for instance. Empirical papers which deal with the validity of each of the two views 
include the studies by POTERBA and SUMMERS (1983) and AUERBACH and HASSETT (2003 and 2007). None of the 
latter studies confirms either of the two views but they suggest that both views are valid depending on the growth 
stage of a corporation. 
11 According to the nucleus theory, immature firms finance their investment expenditures solely by new share issues 
while mature firms mainly rely on retained earnings as investment funds (SINN, 1991b).   6
    The corporate firm's cost of capital is derived from the firm's maximisation problem (see the 
Appendix). The cost of capital formula depends on the corporate, dividend and capital gains tax 
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    The first term on the r.h.s. of the above equation determines the cost of retained earnings, the 
second term the cost of debt finance and the third term the cost of new share issues. Accordingly, 
each unit of investments financed by retained earnings has to earn not only the corporate tax and 
the capital gains tax but also an additional amount which covers the normal return on firm equity, 
r
V.
12 The costs of debt finance consist of the interest cost, i, and the firm-specific agency cost, m
C. 
If new shares are used as a source of funds the marginal investment has to earn a return which is 
at least as high as the required return on firm equity, r
V, augmented by the corporate and the 
dividend tax. 
    If the marginal investment is financed by a combination of the three possible sources of 
finance, the cost of capital is determined as the weighted average of these, as given in equation 
(2). The weight attached to the cost of retained earnings is given by one minus the debt-equity 
ratio, (1-b
C). The share of debt capital is given by the debt-equity ratio, b
C, whereas the weight 
for the cost of external equity is determined by the parameter β.
13 
    The two potential sources of funds on which unincorporated firms can draw are debt, BN
NC, 
and external equity, VN
NC, such that the cost of capital for the non-corporate firm is given by
14 
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    The cost of equity as depicted by the first term on the r.h.s. of equation (3), consists of the 
return on firm equity, r
V, augmented by the personal income tax of the firm owner, τ
P,NC. Hence, 
                                                 
12 Note that the different types of assets are imperfect substitutes within the model. Accordingly, the return to firm’s 
equity, r
V, may differ from the return to capital (bonds) which is equal to the interest rate i. 
13 If the corporate firm relies solely on retained earnings, b





This corresponds to the well-known result derived under the new view of dividend taxation. In contrast, if new 
shares are the exclusive source of funds, b





depends only on the corporate and the dividend tax rate as predicted by the old view of dividend taxation. 
14 See the Appendix for the derivation of the cost of capital for the non-corporate firm.   7
only the personal income tax rate drives a wedge between the marginal product of capital and the 
return on firm equity. The second term on the r.h.s. denotes the cost of debt finance. 
    Equations (2) and (3) reflect the standard theoretical result that the cost of capital and thus the 
investment incentives of a firm vary with regard to the underlying financial behaviour (see also 
AUERBACH (1980 and 2002) for a review on taxation and corporate financial policy). In order to 
identify to what extent the financial behaviour of firms determines the excess burden resulting 
from the differential taxation of corporate and non-corporate firms, we perform several sensitivity 
analyses regarding the amount of debt finance, external equity finance and debt constraints via 
agency costs. 
 
The Tax Differential across Firms of Different Legal Forms 
    The sectoral distinctions in the taxation of incorporated and unincorporated firms are one of 
the major elements of the German tax system. On the one hand, these differences have resulted 
from the partial double taxation which applies to German corporate firms. On the other hand, the 
differences also originate in the one-sided support of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs)
15 which are to a large extent organised like unincorporated firms. Since 82.7 per cent of 
all German enterprises are organised as sole proprietorships or partnerships - while only 15.8 per 
cent belong to the corporate sector - it is a stated goal of the German government to provide 
special benefits for unincorporated companies.
16 
    In detail, retained profits of a German corporation are subject to various taxes including the 
corporate tax, the local trade tax and the solidarity surcharge. Even though the statutory German 
corporate tax rate amounts to only 25 per cent, the effective tax burden on retained earnings of a 
German corporation adds up to 38.3 per cent. If corporate firms distribute their profits, the 
dividend tax additionally applies to half of distributed profits on the shareholder level. According 
to this half-imputation system, the effective tax burden on distributed corporate profits increases 
to 52.3 per cent. 
                                                 
15 Small and medium-sized enterprises are interpreted as those having less than 500 employees and an annual 
turnover not exceeding 500.000 Euro for small firms and 50 million Euro for medium-sized enterprises. 
16 If we look at data on turnover and employment, the importance of non-corporate firms is, however, less 
significant. In the year 2000, non-corporate firms generated 40.8 per cent of total turnover and employed only 35 per 
cent of all employees while corporate firms produced 55.1 per cent of total turnover and employed 65 per cent of all 
employees (own calculations based on GUENTERBERG and WOLTER 2002 and BMF 2004 as well as IAB (INSTITUT 
FÜR ARBEITSMARKT UND BERUFSFORSCHUNG) data).   8
    A German unincorporated firm is also subject to three different types of taxes, namely the 
personal income tax of the firm-owner, the local trade tax and the solidarity surcharge. If the 
owner of the unincorporated firm is subject to the top personal income tax rate of 42 per cent, the 
effective tax burden on unincorporated profits amounts to 45.7 per cent.
17 
    To summarise, a German investor who draws one Euro from an unincorporated investment has 
to pay 45.7 cent in tax vis-à-vis 38.3 cent in the case of a corporate investment financed by 
retained earnings. Accordingly, a German corporate firm which pays no dividends faces a 





3. Empirical Implementation of the CGE Model 
    The computational procedure of any numeric CGE model requires the specification of 
functional forms and the choice of appropriate behavioural parameters and elasticities from the 
empirical literature. In this context, the calibration implies that the initial steady-state of the 
model replicates the stationary long-run macroeconomic equilibrium of the considered 
economy.
19 All behavioural parameters employed here are standard results in line with the 
findings of the empirical literature. The most important ones are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Behavioural Parameter Values 
Economic depreciation rate (FEHR 1999)  0.08 
Half-life of capital accumulation (in years) (CUMMINS ET AL. 1996)  8.0 
Elasticity of factor substitution (GERMAN CENTRAL BANK 1995)  0.80 
Elasticity of the debt-asset ratio (GORDON and LEE 2001)  0.36 
Labour supply elasticity (FENGE ET AL. 2002, weighted average)  0.37 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution (FLAIG 1988)  0.40 
 
The real annual growth rate of the German economy is assumed to be 1.1 per cent, which is, 
according to BANDHOLZ ET AL (2005), a fair estimate for Germany after re-unification. Economic 
depreciation reaches 8 per cent of the capital stock and the adjustment speed towards the new 
                                                 
17 This number additionally accounts for the special tax deduction treatment which applies to the local trade tax. 
18 If, however, dividends are paid out, a German corporate firm faces a tax discrimination of 6.6 percentage points 
vis-à-vis a German unincorporated firm. This special case is analysed in the sensitivity analysis ‘no. 4’. 
19 Even though hardly any model is able to reproduce the macroeconomic equilibrium as detailed as provided by the 
national accounts data, each model should at least reflect the stylised facts of the considered economy.   9
steady-state is determined by the half-life of investment. As in the study of CUMMINS ET AL. 
(1996), we take a value of 8.0, implying that during the following 8 years after the policy shock 
half of the long-run increase in the capital stock is accumulated.
20 
    One of the key parameters describing the production side of the economy is the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital. The empirical literature offers extensive evidence of 
different estimates for this parameter.
21 According to ROSKAMP (1977), the elasticity of factor 
substitution for West German industries ranges between 0.3 and 1.3. We choose for the present 
study to apply a value of 0.8 which is based on estimates by the GERMAN CENTRAL BANK (1995). 
    For the value of the elasticity of the debt-asset ratio, we follow GORDON and LEE (2001), who 
estimate that a 10 percentage point decrease in the corporate tax rate leads to a reduction in the 
debt-asset ratio by about three to four per cent. 
    The labour supply elasticity is set equal to 0.37.
22 This value represents an average of the 
empirical estimates for different age and sex groups found in FENGE ET AL. (2002). Accordingly, 
the applied value lies within the range of 0.2 and 0.43 which, in the opinion of many economists, 
are appropriate values for compensated labour supply elasticities for men and women, 
respectively (FUCHS ET AL. 1998). 
    Given the fact that the macroeconomic effects of capital income taxation are very sensitive to 
the choice of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption (see KING and REBELO 
1990 or SUMMERS 1981), this parameter has to be set with great care. Our value of 0.4 is based 
on FLAIG's (1988) empirical research for Germany, and is just slightly lower than the values 
applied for instance by KEUSCHNIGG and DIETZ (2004) or VALKONEN (1999). 
 
Macroeconomic Data 
    Table 2 reports the main macroeconomic aggregates for Germany for the year 2004, the 
medium-run averages for the period 1998-2004 and the aggregates replicated by our CGE model, 
ifoMOD. The medium-run average is computed over the last six years. 
 
                                                 
20 To achieve this pattern of the half-life of investment, the adjustment cost parameter is set equal to 2. Such a value 
is also applied by VALKONEN (1999) and represents a lower end value of available estimates (see WHITED, 1994). 
21 Most estimates for the elasticity of factor substitution range between 0 and 1, depending on the underlying 
estimation technique. For instance, the study by CHIRINKO, FAZZARI and MEYER (1999), which is based on panel 
data, suggests an elasticity of 0.25, whereas higher values of 0.7 for corporate and 0.5 for non-corporate capital are 
calculated by JORGENSON and YUN (2001), who apply capital stock data. A survey of these studies is provided by 
CHIRINKO (2002). 
22 This value reflects a compensated supply elasticity, which characterises the relevant substitution effect between 
labour and leisure.   10






GDP 2207.2  2182.5  2207.2* 
Compensation of Employees  1134.1  1147.2  1169.8 
Private Consumption  1304.2  1285.8  1304.2* 
Gross Operating Surplus  501.8  470.3  527.1 
Depreciation  328.3 324.6 397.6 
Gross Capital Formation  381.3  429.1  460.1 
Capital  Stock  6586.3 6531.5 5680.6 
Business  Debt  2096.5 2003.8 2390.1 
Government Debt  1394.9  1364.5  1394.9* 
Note:* These values are set exogenously within the model in order to replicate the initial steady-state of the 
German economy. 
Source: Destatis (2005), own calculations. 
 
    The employment of 42.3 million people is computed as the product of the employment share 
0.51 and the total German population of 82.5 million people.
23 This number also matches the 
official German labour force data (DESTATIS 2005). To identify the relative sizes of the corporate 
and non-corporate sector within the economy, we use data from the IAB (INSTITUT FÜR 
ARBEITSMARKT UND BERUFSFORSCHUNG) and compute a labour share of 65 per cent for the 




4. Simulation Results 
    The numerical approach used to measure the excess burden resulting from the differential 
taxation of German incorporated and unincorporated firms is based on a counterfactual analysis. 
We raise the question how the long-run allocation of the economy-wide capital stock between 
sectors changes, if a sector-neutral tax system with an identical effective tax burden on corporate 
and non-corporate firms is implemented. In the German case, such a tax system implies that (1) 
the double taxation of corporate taxation is abolished and (2) an identical profit tax is levied on 
both corporate and non-corporate profits to ensure the tax system is sector-neutral.
24 
                                                 
23 We assume there is full employment in the economy. 
24 In addition, the tax rate on interest income is set equal to the tax rate on firm profits in order to assure financial 
neutrality under this sector-neutral tax system.   11
    Since the uniform profit tax may impede capital accumulation as such, we conduct several 
simulation scenarios to isolate this special level effect. Under each of these scenarios the uniform 
profit tax rate is set equal to 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 per cent. 
    The allocation of capital across sectors evolving in the final steady-state under the respective 
uniform tax rate is taken as a benchmark for the optimal (undistorted) allocation of capital 
between sectors. 
    As Table 3 indicates, under the current German tax system - which determines the initial 
steady-state in our analysis - about 64 per cent of the total capital stock is allocated to the 
corporate sector and the remaining 36 per cent to the non-corporate sector. After the reform, 
when the economy reaches the final steady-state, where both types of firms face an identical tax 
burden, the allocation of capital alters significantly. While the share of capital accumulated 
within the corporate sector declines, additional capital is accumulated within the non-corporate 
sector. This difference in the allocation of capital between the initial and the final steady-state 
provides our measure for the tax-induced distortion in the allocation of capital across sectors in 
Germany. 
 
Table 3: Change in the Allocation of Capital across Sectors (in %)   
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5 
Uniform Profit Tax  30 35 40 45 50 
Δ Capital Stock  14.2 8.9  3.3 -2.4 -8.0 
Initial Allocation (C/NC)  63.8 / 36.2  63.8 / 36.2  63.8 / 36.2  63.8 / 36.2  63.8 / 36.2 
Final Allocation (C/NC)  59.6 / 40.4  58.9 / 41.1  58.2 / 41.8  57.2 / 42.8  56.1 / 43.9 
Δ Debt-Asset Ratio (C/NC)  -3.0 / -5.7  -0.6 / -4.1  2.4 / -2.5  6.1 / -0.5  10.7 / 2.0 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
    Since the initial steady-state is predetermined by the current German situation, the initial 
allocation of capital across sectors is the same under each scenario. The percentage change in the 
overall capital stock varies significantly, however, with the applied uniform profit tax rate. If the 
latter amounts, for instance, to 30 per cent (Scenario 1) both the corporate and the non-corporate 
sector face a major tax relief which fosters capital accumulation. In total, the economy-wide 
capital stock is augmented by 14.2 per cent in the long-run under Scenario 1. If the uniform profit 
tax is set to 50 per cent, both corporate and non-corporate firms are negatively affected by the 
increased tax burden, such that the overall long-run capital stock shrinks by 8.0 per cent, as 
depicted by Scenario 5.   12
    Furthermore, as can be seen from the above table, the allocation of capital in the final steady-
states depends also on the applied uniform tax rate. As the uniform profit tax rate is raised from 
30 to 50 per cent, the amount of misallocated capital increases, too. Under Scenario 1, where a 
uniform profit tax rate of 30 per cent applies, the fraction of misallocated capital amounts to 4.2 
per cent. If the uniform profit tax rate is set to 50 per cent the fraction of misallocated capital 
increases to 7.7 per cent. 
    This larger shift under a higher uniform profit tax rate can be explained by the change in the 
relative tax burden of incorporated and unincorporated firms. For instance, under a uniform profit 
tax rate of 45 per cent (Scenario 4) the corporate firm which was initially subject to an effective 
tax burden of just 38.3 per cent faces a major tax increase, while the non-corporate firms still 
enjoy a slight tax reduction of 0.7 percentage points. In order to counteract the major tax increase, 
the corporate firm adjusts its financial behaviour and increasingly relies on debt finance such that 
the debt-asset ratio of the representative corporate firm increases by 6.1 per cent. Despite the 
adjustment in the financial behaviour of corporate firms, the increase in the uniform tax rate hits 
the corporate sector relatively harder, thus impeding the accumulation of capital within this 
sector. As a consequence, the fraction of misallocated capital increases with the tax rate. 
    As shown in the sensitivity analysis, however, the allocation of capital across sectors in the 
final steady-state hardly depends on the uniform profit tax rate if both types of firm start off with 
an identical debt-asset ratio in the initial steady-state (see Table 5). 
    The per period excess burden which results from the differential taxation of German 
incorporated and unincorporated firms is approximated by multiplication of the amount of 
misallocated capital within each period by the period-specific difference in the marginal product 
of capital between the corporate and the non-corporate sector. At this stage, some remarks might 
be necessary to explain why we do not - in the spirit of Harberger - apply the `triangular formula' 
to compute the excess burden. The answer is straightforward: In the case of a pure steady-state 
comparison, which would resemble a static rather than a dynamic analysis, this approach would 
be appropriate to approximate the excess burden as the marginal product of capital is a downward 
sloping function with regard to capital. In the dynamic analysis conducted, however, we account 
for this decline in the marginal product of capital by re-evaluating the marginal product of capital 
in each period when the stock of capital within the corporate or non-corporate sector has 
changed. Similar to the static analysis, the discrepancy in the marginal product of capital will   13
diminish from period to period and therewith the excess burden, as the allocation of capital across 
sectors improves during the phase of transition. 
 
Table 4: Excess Burden (in Bn. Euro) 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5 
Uniform Profit Tax (in %)  30 35 40 45 50 
Excess Burden (per period)  2.0 2.3 2.6 3.1 3.6 
PV of EB (persistency)  82.1  92.3  104.3 119.3 138.1 
PV of EB (transition)  25.3 28.3 32.9 39.7 49.3 
Average interest rate (in %)  3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
    If the excess burden is expressed in monetary terms, the per period excess burden ranges 
between 2.0 to 3.6 billion Euro, which is equivalent to about 0.1 to 0.16 per cent of GDP. Thus, 
on the assumption that the current German tax system is not changed (= persistency), the present 
value (PV) of the excess burden amounts to about 104 billion Euro (Scenario 4) - or 4.7 percent 
of GDP.
25 If the German tax system is replaced by a sector-neutral tax system with an equal 
effective tax burden on incorporated and unincorporated firms (= transition), the present value of 
the excess burden ranges between 25.3 and 49.3 billion Euro, depending on the size of the 
uniform profit tax rate in place. 
    In what follows we look at the evolution of the excess burden and the misallocation of capital 
over time. During the phase of transition, the stock of capital in the corporate sector shrinks while 
the one in the non-corporate sectors rises. Therefore, (1) the amount of misallocated capital 
declines from period to period and (2) the gap between the marginal products of capital 
diminishes. As a consequence, the resulting excess burden decreases as the allocation of capital 
across sectors improves from one period to the next. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the excess 
burden in the course of time. The solid black line depicts the case of a uniform profit tax of 30 
per cent and the grey line the case of a uniform profit tax of 50 per cent 
    In the first period, the excess burden amounts to about 2.0 (or 3.6) billion Euros, respectively 
and after 8 (or 18) periods it has already declined by almost 50 per cent. Finally, after 60 (or 80) 
periods the allocation of capital has improved so much that the excess burden has almost 
vanished. 
 
                                                 
25 Scenario 4 could be referred to as the reference scenario, as a uniform profit tax rate of 45 per cent seems to be a 
feasible estimate which could ensure that the government's budget is balanced.   14





















    As discussed above, the differential in the effective tax burden and the cost of capital for 
corporate and non-corporate firms crucially depend on the assumed financial behaviour of 
corporate and unincorporated firms. In the following sensitivity analysis we therefore investigate 
to what extent the excess burden is influenced by the financial behaviour of firms. 
 
 
5. Sensitivity Analysis 
    In the first two sensitivity analyses conducted, we check the robustness of our results with 
regard to the debt-asset ratio of firms. We start from the assumption that both corporate and non-
corporate firms have the same initial debt-asset ratio of 50 or 25 per cent, respectively. 
    As reported in Table 5, the change in the overall capital stock again hinges decisively on the 
uniform tax rate applied. The final allocation of capital across sectors, however, is scarcely 
affected by the uniform tax rate if both firm types start off with an identical debt-asset ratio. 
Irrespective of whether we apply a uniform profit tax rate of just 30 per cent, or a higher one of 
50 per cent, the distortion in the allocation of capital amounts in each case to about 5.5 per cent of 
the economy-wide capital stock, if a uniform debt-asset ratio of 50 per cent is assumed. 
    Since the fraction of misallocated capital is almost constant in sensitivity analyses one and two, 
the excess burden arising under the non-uniform taxation of sectors changes only slightly. If we 
set the debt-asset ratio for both firm types to 50 per cent, the per period excess burden amounts to   15
approximately 2 billion Euro. Accordingly, the present value of the excess burden ranges 
between 70 and 80 billion Euro.
26 
 
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis with regard to the Debt-Asset Ratio 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5 
Uniform Profit Tax (in %)  30 35 40 45 50 
Sensitivity Analysis 1: Debt-Asset-Ratio: 50% (each Firm Type) 
Δ Capital Stock  13.9 8.8  3.5 -  2.1  -7.8 
Initial Allocation (C/NC)  65.8 / 34.2  65.8 / 34.2  65.8 / 34.2  65.8 / 34.2  65.8 / 34.2 
Final Allocation (C/NC)  60.1 / 39.9  60.1 / 39.9  60.2 / 39.8  60.3 / 39.7  60.5 / 39.5 
Excess Burden (p.p., bn. €)  2.0  1.98 1.95 1.90 1.83 
PV of EB (persistency, bn. €)  80.8 79.0 76.5 73.4 69.7 
Sensitivity Analysis 2: Debt-Asset-Ratio: 25% (each Firm Type) 
Δ Capital Stock  15.6 9.6  3.1 -3.6  -10.6 
Initial Allocation (C/NC)  66.2 / 33.8  66.2 / 33.8  66.2 / 33.8  66.2 / 33.8  66.2 / 33.8 
Final Allocation (C/NC)  57.5 / 42.5  57.5 / 42.5  57.6 / 42.2  57.6 /42.4  57.7 / 42.3 
Excess Burden (p.p., bn. €)  4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 
PV of EB (persistency, bn. €)  178.4 176.2 173.4 170.0 166.7 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
    If both firm types finance only 25 per cent of new investments via debt, the fraction of 
misallocated capital is slightly higher as in the previous case and amounts to 8.5 per cent. Since a 
larger share of capital is allocated to the sector with a lower marginal product of capital, it is not 
surprising that the resulting per period excess burden is also slightly higher in this second 
sensitivity analysis resulting in the present value of the excess burden. 
    The increased shifting of capital under sensitivity analysis 2 is because of the effective tax 
burden of corporate and non-corporate firms. Since the debt-asset ratio is limited to 25 per cent, 
the non-corporate firm cannot reduce its tax burden by relying more heavily on debt finance as 
compared with the base scenario. The initial tax differential between corporate and non-corporate 
firms is therefore larger, which explains the larger fraction of misallocated capital. 
    A second class of sensitivity analyses is devoted to the controversy of the new versus the old 
view of dividend taxation. In particular, we check the robustness of our results with respect to the 
change in the amount of new share issues used as investment funds. 
                                                 
26 The discrepancy in the present value calculation is because of the different discount rates applied under each 
scenario. The discount rate varies between the different scenarios since it is determined endogenously in the two-
country model and hinges on the economy-wide capital stock.   16
    As discussed in Section 3, to get a proxy for the amount of new share issues utilised as 
investment funds, β, we compute the ratio of annually-issued shares of German corporations and 
the annual investment expenditures of German corporations. In 1991, when Germany reached the 
peak of its new economy boom, the amount of new share issues was more than twice as large as 
the computed 10-year average of 7 per cent. We therefore set the exogenous parameter β to 14 
per cent in the third sensitivity analysis. This change has hardly any impact on the initial 
distribution of capital across sectors (see Table 3). Nevertheless, it affects the allocation of capital 
in the final steady-state. 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis with regard to the Amount of New Share Issues 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5 
Uniform Profit Tax (in %)  30 35 40 45 50 
Sensitivity Analysis 3: New Share Issues: 14% 
Δ Capital Stock  15.3 10.2  4.5  -1.2  -6.9 
Initial Allocation (C/NC)  63.5 / 36.3  63.5 / 36.3  63.5/ 36.3  63.5 / 36.3  63.5 / 36.3 
Final Allocation (C/NC)  61.6 / 38.4  61.0 / 39.0  60.3 / 39.7  59.4 / 40.6  58.3 / 41.7 
Excess Burden (p.p., bn. €)  1.1 1.5 1.9 2.4 3.1 
PV of EB (persistency, bn. €)  45.6 59.1 74.5 93.4  116.7 
Sensitivity Analysis 4: New Share Issues: 100% 
Δ Capital Stock  28.7 22.4 14.9  7.4  -0.1 
Initial Allocation (C/NC)  56.6 / 43.4  56.6 / 43.4  56.6 / 43.4  56.6 / 43.4  56.6 / 43.4 
Final Allocation (C/NC)  73.9 / 26.1  72.5 / 27.5  71.4 / 28.7  69.8 / 30.2  67.7 / 32.2 
Excess Burden (p.p., bn. €)  54.8 50.5 46.8 41.9 35.1 
PV of EB (persistency, bn. €)  2151.2    1937.4 1754.3 1542.1 1279.1 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
    As shown in Table 6, less capital is shifted from the corporate to the non-corporate sector - 
indicating a less severe misallocation of capital across sectors - if firms use twice as much 
external equity for financing investments. This numerical result confirms the theoretical 
prediction. If a corporate firm relies more heavily on new share issues instead of retained 
earnings its effective tax burden increases since, according to the present German tax law, 
corporate distributions are subject to dividend tax while capital gains are tax-exempt. If the 
effective tax burden of the corporate firm increases, the difference between the effective tax 
burden of German incorporated and unincorporated firms diminishes and therewith the tax-
induced misallocation of capital across sectors. As a consequence, the per period excess burden   17
as well as the present value of the excess burden is in any case smaller than the results presented 
in Table 4. 
    The fourth sensitivity analysis represents the old view of dividend taxation in its pure form, 
meaning that all new investments are financed by new share issues only. The old view of 
dividend taxation implies under the present German tax law a partial double taxation of corporate 
profits since half of distributed profits are subject to the personal income tax of the shareholder.
27 
Under the old view therefore the effective tax burden on corporations is larger than the effective 
tax burden on non-corporate firms, such that too little capital is accumulated within the corporate 
sector, which is also implicitly shown by the figures in Table 6. Compared with the benchmark 
case (Table 3), less capital (only 56.6 per cent instead of 63.8 per cent) is allocated to the 
corporate sector in the initial steady-state as a result of the higher tax burden on German 
corporations. Moreover, the higher tax burden on corporate firms impedes the accumulation of 
capital within this sector. This implicitly means that under the counterfactual analysis even a 
larger fraction of capital should be accumulated within the corporate sector. 
    Accordingly, under the old view scenario, almost three times as much capital is misallocated 
compared with the benchmark case (see Scenario 4 of Sensitivity Analysis 4 in Table 6 and 
Scenario 4 in Table 3). This larger distortion in the allocation of capital explains the higher 
excess burden as well. Moreover, as can be seen from Table 6, the excess burden declines with 
the applied uniform profit tax rate. A uniform profit tax rate of just 30 per cent implies a larger 
tax relief for corporate firms compared with non-corporate firms.
28 The tax-induced incentive to 
accumulate capital in the corporate sector is therefore stronger. As opposed to this, a uniform 
profit tax rate of 50 per cent represents only a slight tax cut for corporate firms and accordingly 
incentives are only low to accumulate additional capital in the corporate sector. Consequently, the 
distortion in the allocation of capital and the excess burden diminish with the applied uniform 
profit tax rate. 
    The last sensitivity analysis is performed with respect to the agency cost of debt. This variable 
is of particular importance as it also influences a firm's preference for debt or equity finance. Our 
calibration of the agency cost function is based on GORDON and LEE (2001). The authors estimate 
an elasticity of the debt-asset ratio with regard to the corporate tax rate of 0.36. For our model 
this implies that the effective cost of debt exceeds the interest cost by around 1 percentage point 
                                                 
27 This partial double taxation does not arise under the new view since capital gains are tax-exempt in Germany. 
28 Since we assume here that at the margin all profits are distributed and thus, as discussed in Section 3, we have a 
double taxation of corporate profits.   18
since the agency costs amount to 1.3 and 1.1 per cent for corporate and non-corporate firms 
respectively.  
 
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis with regard to the Agency Cost of Debt 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5 
Uniform Profit Tax (in %)  30 35 40 45 50 
Sensitivity Analysis 5: Debt Elasticity is doubled by half (for both firms) 
Δ Capital Stock  13.9 8.4  3.2 -  2.4  -7.7 
Initial Allocation (C/NC)  63.9 / 36.1  63.9 / 36.1  63.9 / 36.1  63.9 / 36.1  63.9 / 36.1 
Final Allocation (C/NC)  59.5 / 40.4  59.0 / 41.0  58.3 / 41.7  57.5 / 42.5  56.5 / 43.5 
Excess Burden (p.p., bn. €)  1.9 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.3 
PV of EB (persistency, bn. €)  78.7 86.3 96.8  108.4  124.2 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
This last sensitivity analysis shows the effects of increased agency costs on the excess burden. As 
the agency costs are determined by the elasticity of the debt-asset ratio with respect to the 
corporate tax, the 50 per cent higher debt elasticity translates into agency costs of 2.0 and 1.6 per 
cent for incorporated and unincorporated firms respectively. As can be seen from the above table, 
the results are robust with respect to the agency costs. Compared with the benchmark case 
presented in Table 4, the excess burden is only slightly smaller even though the agency costs are 




    The aim of the paper was to shed light on the question whether the different tax burden on 
corporate and non-corporate firms is indeed an issue since it might cause a considerable excess 
burden. Using the German case as an example, we have shown that the differential taxation of 
incorporated and unincorporated firms does lead to efficiency losses. In addition to what is 
already known from the literature, we show that the excess burden crucially depends on the 
source of finance of the investments undertaken by corporate and non-corporate firms. 
    In contrast with the standard Harberger result, however, we find that too much capital is 
accumulated in the corporate sector and too little in the non-corporate sector, since the corporate 
sector in Germany faces a preferential tax treatment vis-à-vis the non-corporate sector, on the 
assumption that investments in the former sector are financed by retained earnings at the margin.   19
The per period excess burden resulting from this misallocation of capital across sectors amounts 
to about 0.1 to 0.16 per cent of GDP, depending on the underlying uniform tax rate assumed in 
each scenario of the counterfactual analysis. Even if these numbers seem to be rather small at first 
sight, given that this kind of excess burden persists as long as corporate and non-corporate firms 
are subject to different tax rules, in present value terms, the excess burden reaches even 5.4 per 
cent of GDP or about 120 billion Euro. 
    Nevertheless, the results depend to a large extent on the assumed financial behaviour of firms. 
If firms are, for instance, debt-constrained, as is the case in the second sensitivity analysis, the 
excess burden arising per period is only slightly higher and amounts to about 0.2 per cent of 
GDP. In present value terms, however, this difference is quite significant, since the present value 
of the excess burden rises to about 170 billion Euro or 7.7 per cent of GDP. The limited use of 
debt prevents especially non-corporate firms from reducing their tax burden by relying more 
heavily on debt financing. Thus, the initial tax differential between corporate and non-corporate 
firms is larger, resulting in the share of misallocated capital. 
    Regarding new shares as the marginal source of finance, we find that a slight increase in the 
share of external equity finance has only a small impact on the estimated excess burden. As 
opposed to this, if firms rely up to 100% on new share issues as investments funds, as predicted 
by the old view of dividend taxation, the arising excess burden is more than ten times larger 
compared with the benchmark case. This outcome is because of the partial double taxation of 
German corporate profits under the old view, which implies that too little capital is accumulated 
within the corporate sector. Accordingly, in the counterfactual analysis where both corporate and 
non-corporate firms face the same tax burden, even more capital should be accumulated in the 
corporate sector. 
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Appendix – Inter-temporal Optimisation of Firms: 
 
 
    To solve the inter-temporal optimisation problem of the representative firm of either sector, we 
start with the expression of net of tax profits, namely 
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C, as well as 
the expression for new share issues, VN
C = β IN
C, and combining it with the above profit equation 
(A.1), we derive an explicit expression denoting dividends of corporate firms 
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true. Moreover, no dividend tax applies to non-corporate firms, τ
D,NC=0. 
    In equilibrium, firm equity yields a net of tax return of r
V which comprises net of tax dividend 
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If we keep in mind that a firm can only maximise its end of period value, 
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Moreover, we define the shadow prices of capital 
,, /
ef ef f
ttt qd V d K ≡  and debt 
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respectively,
30 as well as the following three tax parameters for corporate and non-corporate 
firms 
                                                 
29 If the financial market investment and the investment in firm equity are assumed to be perfect substitutes, the 
investors’ arbitrage condition requires that the net of tax return on firm equity equals the net of tax return earned at 
the financial market, r
V=(1-τ
i)i. The variable τ










(1 )(1 ) (1 )
( )   ,              ,
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
( )    (1 ) ,           1,
(1 )
(1 )
( )   ,                             1.
(1 )





























    (A.5) 
 
 
such that the optimality conditions with regard to the control variables labour, L
f, investment, I
f, 
and new debt, BN
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and the envelope conditions with regard to the stock variables are given by 
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To obtain an equation representing optimal debt policy, equations (A.7b) and (A.6c) need to be 
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Accordingly, the l.h.s. of the above equation represents the cost of equity while the r.h.s. denotes 
the cost of debt financing. The optimal debt level is achieved if the costs of internal financing are 
                                                                                                                                                              
30 The shadow prices determine the increase in the value of the objective function resulting from a marginal increase 
in the stock variables’ capital or debt.   22
equal to the cost of external financing. If the last two equations (A.8) and (A.9) are combined, the 
marginal product of capital can be expressed as the weighted sum of the cost of equity capital and 
external capital, where the debt-asset ratio, b
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These equations enable us to determine the cost of capital which influences the investment 
decision of the firm as well as the cost of equity and debt finance which determine a firm's 
financing behaviour. 
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